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Executive Summary 
 The current debate over cost-benefit concerns in agencies’ evaluations of government 
regulations is not so much whether to consider costs and benefits at all but rather what belongs in 
the estimated costs and benefits. Overlaid is the long-standing belief that the distribution of costs 
and benefits needs some consideration in policy evaluations. In a recent article in the University 
of Chicago Law Review, Robert Frank and Cass Sunstein proposed a relatively simple method 
for adding distributional concerns to policy evaluation that enlarges the typically constructed 
estimates of the individual’s willingness to pay for safer jobs or safer products. One might pay 
more for safety if it were the result of a government regulation that mandated greater safety 
across-the-board. Frank and Sunstein argue that the reason for enlarging current estimates is that 
someone who takes a safer job or buys a safer product gives up wages or pays a higher price, 
which then moves him or her down in the ladder of income left over to buy other things. 
Alternatively, a worker who is given a safer job via a government regulation will have no 
relative income consequences if all workers have lower pay. We show that when considering the 
core of the Frank and Sunstein proposal carefully one concludes that current regulatory 
evaluations should be left alone because there is no reason to believe that relative positional 
effects can be well identified quantitatively, are important to personal decisions in general, or are 
important to well constructed cost-benefit calculations of government regulations. 
 
 One of the practical problems with trying to consider relative position of income and 
consumption when estimating willingness to pay is that there is no unique way to ascertain, from 
a statistical model, the person’s actual social reference group. A researcher must specify ex ante 
a reference group and then net out the behavioral effects of a possibly incorrectly attributed 
reference group’s behavior on the individual. There is no well-established result from survey 
data for a typical person’s economic reference group. Moreover, the econometric literature 
generally finds that reference group or social interaction effects are unlikely to be identified 
uniquely or are small and easily ignored, perhaps because the relative positional effects of 
workplace or product safety offset possible reference group effects on income. 
 
 To some extent, Frank and Sunstein’s recommended increase in the value of willingness 
to pay for safety used in current regulatory evaluations is already considered. Regulatory 
evaluations often include a pessimistic and an optimistic value of likely benefits, and Frank and 
Sunstein’s suggested revised value of willingness to pay is still below the optimistic case that 
carefully formulated cost-benefit studies use. It is easy to show that almost doubling the 
estimated value of a statistical life would have an inconsequential effect on the economic 
desirability of a broad set of regulatory policies. 
 
 Finally, we argue that the most important refinements in the area of regulatory evaluation 
would be for agencies involved to adhere more to the framework of what is generally considered 
a carefully done cost-benefit study and for agencies to make greater actual use of appropriately 
done cost-benefit studies when recommending regulations. 
Introduction 
 An exciting recent development in cost-benefit evaluation of policy is the issuance of so-
called prompt letters by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office 
of Management and Budget (Hahn and Sunstein 2001). OIRA’s prompt letters, which are made 
public, have openly encouraged agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to explore specifically named regulations that 
OIRA believes may be cost beneficial, such as possibly requiring automatic external 
defibrillators in the workplace. Whether prompt letters and other efforts to reform the regulatory 
process will be successful depends ultimately on how one values the benefits and costs of the 
regulations. Frank and Sunstein (2001) propose that benefit estimates used to value lives in 
regulatory studies, such as the ones OIRA seeks to foster, be increased. Their rationale for 
enlarging benefit calculations is that, as currently constructed, benefit estimates do not account 
for the role of people’s concerns over relative economic position in society. We argue against 
replacing the current approach to valuing risks to life and health because pinning down the 
importance of relative position is statistically impracticable, because there is little evidence that 
relative position is important to individual decisions, and because even if relative position were 
important to individual decisions, policy decisions involving cost-benefit calculations would 
remain largely unchanged. 
In the absence of explicit legislative prohibition, a comparison of costs to outcomes 
coupled with economic balancing is now the default standard when formulating a new 
government regulation (Sunstein 2000). Cost-outcome balancing means weighing the policy’s 
benefits and costs. Although studies of programs’ costs and outcomes have been deservedly 
criticized for lack of completeness, Executive Order 12866 makes agencies provide a regulatory 
impact evaluation if a rule or regulation may “have an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 
  
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
governments or communities (Hahn, et al. 2000).” Similar intent that costs and outcomes be 
considered explicitly appears in the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995. In what may have a 
dampening effect on cost and benefit comparisons in decision making, at least in the private 
sector, juries seem to punish private sector firms that try to balance costs and benefits of harm to 
customer or worker health when making production decisions prior to accidents and ultimate tort 
suits (Viscusi 2001). Still, where government regulations are concerned, no longer is the debate 
mostly over whether to consider costs and benefits but rather mostly over what belongs in the 
cost and benefit columns.1 
Frank and Sunstein offer a simple solution to the thorny issue of how to incorporate non-
uniform net benefits across initially advantaged versus disadvantaged groups when calculating 
net benefits of a regulation. In particular, they suggest that the valuation of safety depends on 
one’s reference group and would be quite different depending on which other groups are also 
paying for safety-enhancing policies. We argue that there are conceptual and practical flaws to 
the modest proposal of Frank and Sunstein so that producers and users of studies of regulatory 
cost and outcomes should not adopt their idea. In particular, there is no unique way to identify a 
person’s social reference group from a statistical model of individual behavior, and there are no 
well-established survey results concerning reference group membership. Moreover, there is 
much statistical evidence that postulated social reference group effects are small and of little 
consequence for a broad set of individual behaviors. Because carefully constructed cost-benefit 
studies consider a range of values that encompass the adjustment suggested by Frank and 
Sunstein, decision makers should retain the current approach of using absolute benefit values 
rather than Frank and Sunstein’s adjusted benefit values. Of greater value to policymakers than 
what Frank and Sunstein recommend would be for regulatory agencies to require more careful 
cost-benefit studies than are now typical, and for the agencies to make greater use of cost-benefit 
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studies that adhere to best available practice guidelines. Use of speculative reference group 
adjustments could potentially undermine the perceived legitimacy of the valuation of reduced 
risks to life and health. 
Current Practice in Policy Evaluation 
 As currently practiced, analysis of the benefits of risk reduction typically relies on 
multivariate statistical estimates of what a worker is implicitly willing to accept to incur risks on 
the job or what a consumer is implicitly willing to pay for a safer product. Estimates of risk-
money tradeoffs underlie the estimated benefits of saving a statistical life, known either as the 
implicit value of life or the value of a statistical life. Risk-money tradeoffs also underlie the 
estimated benefits of preventing certain non-fatal injuries, sometimes referred to as the implicit 
value of harm or the implicit value of injury. Government regulations mandating greater safety 
will lower wages and raise product prices so that the ultimate costs of attendant safety 
enhancements are paid for by the end users of the safety: workers and consumers. The change in 
wages or prices then reveals the value of a regulation-induced safety enhancement to compare to 
cost calculations in a cost-benefit analysis.  
 The standard procedure used to calculate benefit values for any government program is 
the amount society is willing to pay for the program’s benefits. In the case of risk regulation, the 
reference point is our willingness to pay for the risk reduction achieved by the regulation. In the 
case of policies that save lives, the question is not how much people are willing to pay for the 
particular outcomes in terms of actual lives saved, but how much people are willing to pay for 
reductions in the risk to life for a much broader population group. The benefit being purchased at 
the time of the policy decision is reduced risks to life, not the saving of lives that are identifiable 
ex post.  
 3
  
 To establish meaningful values for the tradeoffs people are willing to make between risk 
and money, economists have examined choices people make in the marketplace. The reason for 
focusing on actual decisions is that they reflect how much people value safety themselves in their 
own decisions. In contrast, if government officials picked the values on their own, we would be 
getting the benefit values of government bureaucrats not the benefits of the population at large. 
Similarly, instead of relying on market evidence, we could undertake a survey of how much 
people value safety. Although survey evidence is often useful, obtaining honest and reliable 
responses is often problematic. The continuing controversy over the use of contingent valuation 
methods to value environmental damages attests to difficulties over accuracy of contingent value 
estimates. Obtaining market-based estimates of the value of life is complicated by the fact that 
risks to life are seldom traded solely for money. Rather, money and risks are bundled as part of a 
set of many characteristics of jobs or products. The task for economists is to use statistical 
methods to isolate the tradeoff between money and risk embodied in these market decisions.  
 A chief source of risk-money tradeoffs information has been estimates from the labor 
market. Using large data sets on worker behavior, one can estimate the incremental wages 
workers receive in return for facing added risk, controlling for other aspects of the worker’s job. 
The wage increment approach yields an implicit value of life in the range of $3 million to $7 
million for most studies in the literature.2 For the sake of convenience, we will take the midpoint 
of about $5 million as indicating an appropriate value of a statistical life based on market wage-
risk tradeoffs. So, if workers faced an annual job fatality risk of one chance in 10,000, an implicit 
value of life of $5 million implies that each worker would require an extra $500 to face the added 
1/10,000 risk of death. Put somewhat differently, if there were 10,000 workers affected, each of 
whom faced a job risk of one chance in 10,000, and then there would be one expected statistical 
death to the group. In return for facing the 1/10,000 risk there would be a wage supplement of 
$500 for each of the 10,000 workers, or a total of $5 million more paid in wages. Implicitly, the 
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group of workers are willing to exchange total compensation of $5 million to accept the extra 
risk of one statistical death to their group, which gives rise to the value of a statistical life of $5 
million. We will refer to estimates of extra group compensation as the implicit value of life 
figures. Market based estimates of the value of life are not constructed to the labor market. 
Similar estimates have been derived based on analysis of housing price responses to hazardous 
waste risks, the higher prices commanded by safer cars, and the tradeoffs reflected in many other 
product choices related to the price versus the product’s safety, quality or reliability. 
 The sound basis of estimates of the value of life is of tremendous importance in 
establishing the legitimacy of cost-benefit analyses. Surely, valuation of risks to life is 
potentially controversial. Indeed, it is an exercise that some might view as immoral. The market 
values establish a sound basis for estimates of people’s benefits of improvements to their health 
and safety because they can be traced to people’s own valuations reflected in real decisions. In 
addition, the substantial value of life figures that are well in excess of the present value of 
people’s earnings establish a high value that helps diminish concern that risks to life are being 
undervalued. 
Practitioners of cost-benefit analysis have assembled several panels of experts to make 
recommendations for what a well-formulated cost-benefit comparison should contain in the areas 
of the environment, health, and medicine with the goal of increasing realism and transparency of 
calculations and decisions to be drawn (Gold, et al. 1993; Arrow, et al. 1996). A common 
concern for cost-benefit analysis is that distribution of costs and benefits by, say, income or race 
not be totally ignored when reporting and applying cost-benefit analysis. If two policies have the 
same total costs and total benefits one might argue on equity grounds that the policy that does 
more for the poor should be preferred. However, addressing issues of distribution more generally 
are controversial and can be used carelessly or strategically (Viscusi 2000b). 
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A stumbling block in applying adjustments for distributional considerations has been how 
to do it in practice while maintaining the well-known objective of KISS (Keep It Sophisticatedly 
Simple). Frank and Sunstein present a clearly argued KISS-based proposal for incorporating 
income distribution consequences of health and safety regulations into ultimate decisions based 
on policy analyses. We contend that the conceptual and practical flaws we identify should make 
practitioners of cost-benefit analysis justifiably unmoved by the refinements offered by Frank 
and Sunstein. 
Frank and Sunstein’s Refinement to Current Practice 
Frank and Sunstein (2001) propose that economists, lawyers, and policymakers not use 
typical implicit value of life figures but instead use value of life figures that consider persons’ 
relative economic positions. Frank and Sunstein contend that people are on “a positional 
treadmill” in which they accept extra pay for job risks in an effort to achieve relative economic 
(income/consumption) status. In their view the standard estimates used in the federal government 
of a value of life of about $4 million should be increased. Their stated rationale for boosting 
estimated values of life is as follows: 
The essential reason for our claim is that people care a great deal about their relative 
economic position, and not solely, and often not mostly, about their absolute economic 
position. Current estimates tell us what an individual, acting in isolation, would be 
willing to pay for, say, an increase in safety on the job. But when an individual buys 
additional safety in isolation, he experiences not only an absolute decline in the amounts 
of other goods and services he can buy, but also a decline in his relative living standards. 
In contrast, when a regulation requires all workers to purchase additional safety, each 
worker gives up the same amount of other goods, so no worker experiences a decline in 
relative living standards. If relative living standards matter, then an individual will value 
an across-the-board increase in safety more highly than an increase in safety that he alone 
purchases.3 
 
 Frank and Sunstein maintain that a worker’s concern over relative economic position 
means that, as currently calculated, market wage-risk tradeoffs understate the implicit value of 
life. So, if the government now uses $4 million as the average value of life, in their view, 
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additional concerns over workers’ relative positions should increase the appropriate amount to a 
range from $4.7 million to $7 million.4 For the $5 million reference point that we introduced 
above, the value-of-life range would be from $5.9 million to $8.8 million. Thus, the main effect 
of their procedure would be to boost the estimated average value of life used in benefit 
assessment by 18 percent to 75 percent over what is currently used. 
The main, and surely controversial, innovation to cost-benefit analysis argued for by 
Frank and Sunstein is a contention that persons care not only about the other things they can buy 
besides safety, but also about how their consumption of other things or income compares to the 
income and consumption of other persons in society. Frank and Sunstein believe that not only 
does my personal sense of well-being depend on my own income but that it also depends on 
where I am located in the income pecking order of whatever demographic barnyard I may belong 
to emotionally. In the Frank and Sunstein view of regulatory evaluation, greater mandated safety 
has attached to it the additional cost of moving down the income distribution, and conventional 
estimates of willingness to pay incorporate the individual’s cost of having more safety from 
being made worse off in a comparative residual income sense. 
Frank and Sunstein conclude that conventional cost-benefit analysis undervalues health 
and safety regulation because the benefits are understated. Because a regulation makes everyone 
in the relevant group consume more safety and suffer similar wage reductions and price 
increases, there is no change in anyone’s relative economic position from a widespread 
regulation. According to Frank and Sunstein, conventional benefit calculations that use risk-
money tradeoff estimates are too low, and therefore conventional cost-benefit calculations are 
too economically pessimistic about society’s gain from the regulation. This is because 
conventional estimates of the value of life are individualistic and net out the person’s private loss 
from moving down the income distribution. Their bottom line is to argue that conventionally 
calculated value of life estimates should be increased when deciding whether to adopt a 
 7
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regulation that would save statistical lives. The obvious possible practical consequence of what 
Frank and Sunstein contend is that some regulations that are currently viewed as not worthwhile 
may be considered as generating benefits in excess of costs. 
Conceptual and Practical Weaknesses of Frank and Sunstein’s 
Proposal 
 Often the devil is in the details. Here the devil is in what Frank and Sunstein leave out of 
the details. The standard economic approach to understanding a person’s or a firm’s decisions is 
symmetric in that the price is compared to the economic value of the good or service. Frank and 
Sunstein want an asymmetry in the individual’s decision such that in addition to the usual 
economic benefit a service or a good provides at a cost equal to its price there is a second price 
(cost) of safety if one buys it in isolation. The second (hidden) cost is less purchasing power for 
other things compared to the other members of a person’s reference group. Residual income has 
a so-called positional effect in that the person implicitly buying the safety would also pay an 
additional amount not to have an associated decline in comparative command over other things 
such as clothing or pleasure travel. The amount one would pay to avoid moving down the social 
consumption ladder would then be added into any social calculation of the benefits of a safety-
enhancing regulation that is applied universally. 
Asymmetric Treatment of Relative Position’s Importance 
Consumption can surely be a status symbol, and Frank and Sunstein are correct in 
suggesting that higher income confers greater economic status. However, there are other 
attributes associated with a job that may be consequential as well. Perhaps most pertinent here is 
that being in good health is a highly valued attribute. People may simply have a preference for 
safer jobs because safe jobs protect individual health. 
  
We find the Frank and Sunstein willingness to focus on residual income (non-safety 
consumption) position somewhat odd. If I care about my relative income I should also care about 
my relative health and safety.5 Frank and Sunstein argue that workers know their relative income 
position but do not know their relative safety position at work. At the risk of sounding like the 
cartoon sociologist to whom two anecdotes are a large data set and one anecdote is a small data 
set, a brief story is in order. One of us once worked during the summer in a chemical plant. 
Everyone in the plant knew that working in the acid production department was much more 
dangerous than working in the sodium production department. Most butchers we have met have 
part of at least one finger missing, and most roofers we have met have a broken back of varying 
degrees of severity. One also need not have the same reference group for safety as for residual 
consumption.6 Workers do know their relative workplace safety, so it is difficult to accept safety 
in the workplace as a non-positional good. 
 We contend that if income remaining after one implicitly purchases more safety or health 
affects the feeling of well-being indirectly via the relative ability to purchase fewer other things, 
then a regulation makes one better off because the additional safety or health is not only absolute 
but also relative to a reference group. Safety or health may also be commensurately positional 
because I get additional well-being from being safer than my neighbors or colleagues. If it seems 
reasonable for one to care about how his or her consumption of non-safety things compares to 
the consumption of others, then it also seems reasonable that one could care commensurately 
about how his or her consumption of safety and health compares to others’ safety and health. The 
two positional effects may then simply cancel. The supplemental welfare effect of moving up the 
safety ladder can cancel the supplemental welfare effect of moving down the consumption of all 
other things ladder, and we are back to the familiar case where only the absolute levels of safety 
and residual income need be considered. 
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One source of evidence regarding countervailing positional effects where health is 
concerned is revealed by the relationship between income and the desire for health insurance. As 
people get richer, do they have greater desire to purchase health insurance to protect their health? 
The evidence here is quite strong. Economic estimates suggest that as one’s income increases by 
some percentage, the demand for health insurance also increases but at roughly half that rate.7 
The observed relationship between income and the desire to protect one’s health suggests to us 
that workers are concerned not only with their income position but also with their health position 
in society. 
 An even more direct piece of evidence on countervailing health positional considerations 
pertains to how persons’ attitudes toward bearing risks on the job vary with their income levels. 
Consider the following evidence on chemical workers’ attitudes toward facing greater risks of 
job injury. For chemical workers in this study the main matter of interest is not the implicit value 
of life but rather the implicit value of a job injury as reflected in the tradeoff workers are willing 
to make between higher pay and greater risks of injury from the job. Evidence for chemical 
workers indicates that the implicit value of a job injury increases quite strongly with income. 
Thus, a 10 percent increase in income would boost the value attached to avoiding a job injury 
from 6.7 percent to 11 percent.8 A higher income enables one to avoid the risky jobs, which quite 
simply are not that attractive, and means that people seem to show willingness to trade off 
income position against an improved health position. 
The undesirability of hazardous work is also reflected in who takes such jobs. Are the 
most dangerous jobs in the firm the most sought after positions by workers in an effort to boost 
their economic status relative to their peers? That those dangerous jobs are sought after because 
they allow relatively high consumption of goods and services is the story line that would offer 
much support for the Frank and Sunstein perspective that workers try to boost their economic 
status through hazardous work. In practice, what we observe is opposite the basic Frank and 
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Sunstein proposition. Risky jobs tend to be staffed in large part by new hires that tend to have 
very little job experience.9 Indeed, as many as one-third of all manufacturing quits may be due to 
the influence of job hazards.10 Rather than workers seeking out risky positions, new workers fill 
hazardous jobs that tend to be primarily entry level and are jobs that workers quit quickly to 
avoid facing the attendant health risks. The rapid flight of workers from the risky entry level jobs 
is consistent with our empirical observation that hazardous jobs tend to be among the least 
attractive positions in any enterprise. They also tend to be smelly, dirty, and undesirable jobs in 
other respects as well. Risky jobs are not the treasured targets of opportunity for upward mobility 
that Frank and Sunstein envision. 
 To be fair, Frank and Sunstein acknowledge the possibility that safety and health are 
positional goods, too, although they claim the positionality of health and safety is less than the 
positionality of residual income. Frank and Sunstein also consider implications of a situation 
where safety or health is partly positional, but not as positional as residual consumption.11 
Specifically, Frank and Sunstein mention the situation where the positional effect of residual 
consumption is half offset by the positional impact of safety. Does it matter whether safety and 
health are partly versus totally non-positional to the practice and use of cost-benefit analysis? 
Does the core of their argument affect what is “good enough for government work?” Soon we 
will demonstrate that “where the rubber hits the road,” so to speak, in the practice of cost-benefit 
analysis, nothing will change because of the refinements Frank and Sunstein propose. 
Finally, although Frank and Sunstein mention the phenomenon of loss aversion, they do 
not explore fully how it weakens the argument for a possible role of relative position effects in 
benefit assessment.12 To elaborate, loss aversion can alter how we view the role of job risks. If 
people are, in reality, quite averse to incurring substantial losses in income, then it will have 
tremendous consequences for the attractiveness of hazardous jobs. If one is maimed or killed on 
the job, either the worker or the worker’s survivors will experience a substantial drop in income. 
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Because hazardous jobs are intrinsically linked to the prospect of substantial losses, it is unclear 
that a worker will gain relative social status through work on dangerous-high wage jobs. The key 
aspect is that a job is a bundled commodity that includes both current and future income 
consequences, adverse health consequences, and potentially unattractive non-pecuniary losses. 
Given an undesirable mix of attributes along with the higher wage premium for the job, will 
working on a dangerous job in fact confer the kind of social climbing effects that Frank and 
Sunstein envision? 
Flawed Evidence of Relative Position’s Importance 
 Getting a handle on how people value their relative position with respect to others is a 
difficult empirical task. There is little multivariate statistical evidence that people’s economic 
behavior depends importantly on peer or reference group behavior.13 Frank and Sunstein present 
a variety of suggestive evidence that relative economic position may matter, but the character of 
their evidence tends to be less compelling than that for market values of wage-risk tradeoffs. It is 
also less concrete than our contradictory evidence presented above, which is based on actual 
market behavior rather than thought experiments and general surveys of people’s happiness. 
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 One type of evidence they present pertains to various types of thought experiments. For 
example, would you rather live in World A where you earned $110,000 per year while others 
earned $200,000, or would you rather live in World B where you earned $100,000 per year while 
others earned $85,000? The subjects in their positional income thought experiment are also told 
that the income figures represent real purchasing power. About half their experimental subjects, 
which include University of Chicago Law School students, say that they would prefer the World 
B situation with higher relative income. Frank and Sunstein interpret the slight majority favoring 
World B as evidence of the importance of relative position. An even more plausible 
interpretation of the subjects’ conjectures is that experimental situations premised on an 
economic falsehood will not be taken at face value by respondents. People will realize that in 
  
World A, where they earn just over half of what everybody earns, the prices of goods and 
services will be bid up and they will be less well off than if their earnings are greater than 
everyone else’s. Including the disclaimer that income figures represent real purchasing power 
does not overcome the underlying difficulty that the disclaimer is an economic falsehood. The 
equal purchasing power disclaimer will not be fully credible to experimental student subjects 
who realize the importance of their income within the context of the incomes of other people in 
giving them access to goods and services in our economy. 
 A second kind of evidence Frank and Sunstein muster pertains to happiness surveys. 
Researchers have found that when you ask people whether they are “very happy,” “fairly happy,” 
or “not happy” their answers are strongly correlated with their relative income within the 
country.14 How should one answer a categorical happiness question when it is posed? One 
cannot resort to a thermometer or a weight scale to obtain an objective reading. Categorical 
happiness questions are by their nature answered within their social context. The same kinds of 
research as discussed by Frank and Sunstein indicate that the distribution of responses to 
categorical happiness questions tends to be unaffected by changes in overall levels of income 
over time. The phenomenon of no income-level effect is also consistent with the relative 
character of the question. If one asked a person in the late 1800s to assess personal happiness, the 
person might have indicated that he or she was very happy if there were a functioning well and 
an outhouse in close proximity. However, having the two amenities from the year 1800 today 
would probably not make one feel “very happy.” 
In much the same way, studies regarding what budget is needed to obtain some minimum 
comfort level or “to get along in this community” are also likely to be influenced by the current 
standard of living.15 People’s life expectancies were less 50 or 100 years ago, and many of the 
products we now purchase on a mass scale, such as a telephone or a television, were formerly 
restricted to a narrow band of relatively wealthy consumers. What we need “to get along in this 
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community” necessarily changes with the community’s standard of living. Relative questions 
will necessarily generate relative answers, but they do not bolster the Frank and Sunstein core 
proposition. Answers to questions about relative income or consumption simply do not constitute 
a valid test of the importance of relative positional effects in willingness to pay calculations. 
 The linchpin of the Frank and Sunstein insights on policy evaluation of workplace safety 
regulation is that workers seek a positional status benefit by accepting dangerous jobs, which 
confer higher income. How much higher income? Suppose we again use as a starting point for 
discussion a value of life estimate of $5 million, which exceeds the $4 million figure Frank and 
Sunstein use as their baseline. The average worker in the United States economy faces an annual 
death risk on the order of one chance in 20,000.16 With a value of life of $5 million and a death 
risk of one chance in 20,000, the average worker exposed to such a risk will receive 
supplemental annual compensation of 1/20,000 × $5 million = $250 a year, which is roughly $5 
extra gross earnings per week. Working on a dangerous job may enable you to buy an extra value 
meal every week at McDonalds but will not buy a Rolex watch, a BMW, or any high-impact 
status symbol that one can flaunt to demonstrate one’s higher economic status. The point is that 
one does not buy much extra relative consumption for accepting a job that is two or three times 
more dangerous than the average job. 
 The Frank and Sunstein maintained proposition, that positional effects are important to 
evaluating willingness to pay and attendant regulatory benefits, is flawed with respect to their 
attribution of the relevant reference group. As is indicated by the quote above, Frank and 
Sunstein believe that if all workers are required to purchase additional safety, then there will not 
be a positional effect. Only when an individual worker must have greater job safety is relative 
position consequential, so that regulatory policies will supposedly not be subject to the positional 
evaluation bias that affects market tradeoffs. However, safety policies in the United States are 
not financed by general revenues so that costs are spread across the entire society. If there is a 
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government regulation of, for example, the risks of explosion in a grain elevator, then the 
regulation will boost the costs to the firm and will be borne, at least in part, by other workers at 
the firm because the regulation can raise the price of the product and reduce sales and the firm’s 
subsequent demand for workers. The neighbors of the grain elevator workers who perhaps work 
for a construction firm or the highway department will not be affected by the costs of the grain 
elevator safety regulation. Only the grain elevator’s workers will incur the major share of the 
regulatory costs. In the case of the typical regulation just described, there will still be the 
economic status effects that concern Frank and Sunstein. Only when everybody in society shares 
in a regulation’s cost will there be no positional reshuffling. How a regulation’s cost must be 
shared for there not to be a positional effect is unclear. We do not know whether it is the absolute 
cost amount that should be equalized across people or whether it should be a proportional effect 
on their income, or some other formula in order to ensure positional neutrality. 
 We end our discussion of the fundamental empirical issues surrounding supplementing 
cost-benefit analysis with relative positional effects by noting that what Frank and Sunstein 
idealize is not practicable. Because possible reference groups are nested inside each other, the 
individual’s reference group cannot be uniquely identified in multivariate statistical models of 
individual outcomes (Manski 1993, Moffitt 2001). To elaborate, suppose we consider the effects 
of others’ incomes on my behavior and that my true reference group is only my neighbor living 
in the house to the east. The researcher cannot know that only the income of one neighbor enters 
my decisions, so that a statistical model incorrectly attributing my reference group as all the 
houses on my block will find that the average income on my block is statistically significant to 
my behavior because incomes are positively correlated across houses nearby. 
Narrow Practical Implications 
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 Let us come at the issue of positionality in cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of 
persons outside the Ivory Tower who use and defend cost-effectiveness calculations. Frank and 
  
Sunstein contend that income position matters in addition to income level where individual well-
being is calculated and then linked to safety. They suggest a 50 per cent add factor on the value 
of life estimates currently in play. A second anecdote is in order. One of us spent a year in the 
private sector doing cost-effectiveness studies in a major drug company where there is much 
financial incentive to discover defensible arguments for increasing the benefits of a health 
enhancing pharmacotherapy. Even in an environment as profit-oriented as a drug company, it 
would be impossible to use made-up examples of Smith and Jones and introspection to convince 
senior managers that the company could justify increasing the advertised benefit of the 
pharmacotherapy by half. No one on the cost-benefit analysis firing line is going to cite thought 
experiments or a comparison of pay and performance in three selected occupations as 
justification for changing benefit calculations as typically done now. Multivariate statistical 
evidence of the extent of any positional effects in income will be needed, and we have just noted 
that reference group effects cannot be uniquely estimated. 
 The only study of even tangential relevance available on possible welfare effects of 
relative income position is the Dutch study by van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985) 
that Frank and Sunstein discuss. Without commenting on the quality of the statistical model or 
the generalizability of the results in the Dutch study used by Frank and Sunstein, let us simply 
note that Frank and Sunstein interpret the results of the Dutch data as indicating that a 33 percent 
increase in willingness to pay is implied because a person would feel indifferent between the 
current situation and one in which he or she got a 33 percent increase in income while everyone 
else of importance to the individual got a 100 percent increase in income. The implication is that 
someone who would pay $1.00 for additional safety when consuming it alone via a $1 higher 
product price or $1 lower wage would also pay $1.33 if everyone else were regulated to consume 
the extra safety so that there is no relative decline in one’s residual consumption. If safety is 
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partly, but not totally positional too, then the add factor is perhaps half of the 33 percent or 17 
percent. 
In our judgment, the best estimate Frank and Sunstein could offer is to increase values 
attached to the benefits of risk reduction by 17 to 33 percent in the typical cost-benefit study. 
However, it does not matter for evaluating a regulation’s cost effectiveness whether one 
increases regulatory benefits, as usually computed, by 17, 33, or even 50 percent. Bumping up 
the benefits by the amounts suggested by Frank and Sunstein will not change how benefit 
estimates enter currently conducted regulatory evaluations.17 
 Another useful measure of the extent to which the Frank and Sunstein approach might 
make a difference in policy evaluation comes from finding the number of additional regulations 
that would pass a cutoff of benefits being greater than costs if one applied the Frank and Sunstein 
33 percent add factor to benefits. For the sake of concreteness, let us rely on the cost per life 
saved table compiled by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and reported in a 
book by Justice Stephen Breyer.18 We have converted Judge Breyer’s table into graphical form 
as Figure 1. In his book, Breyer summarizes the cost per life saved for 53 different government 
policies. Now take the reference point value of $4 million per statistical life saved, which Frank 
and Sunstein take as the current applied government standard when evaluating regulations. So, 
policies with a cost per life saved less than $4 million would pass the benefit-cost test, and 
policies with a cost per life saved greater than $4 million would fail the benefit-cost test. 
Suppose we raise the value of life to $4.7 million (= $4 million × 1.17), the most conservative 
add factor Frank and Sunstein discuss. Upping the benefit per statistical life saved by $0.7 
million leads to three additional regulations to now pass a benefit-cost test: rear lap/shoulder 
belts for autos, standards for radionuclides in uranium mines, and benzene NESHAP regulation 
(original: fugitive emissions). 
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What if instead we use the most liberally adjusted (for positional effects) estimate of the 
value of life that Frank and Sunstein consider, $7 million (= $4 million × 1.75)? No additional 
regulations would be affected by increasing the value of life cutoff from $4.7 million to $7 
million. In all, only three of the 53 regulations listed by Justice Bryer would become cost-
effective if we moved from current value of life amounts to the upper bound of the Frank and 
Sunstein estimates. Almost doubling the value of life in economic regulatory evaluation as is 
currently would have little effect on the economic desirability of a wide range of regulatory 
policies. The most basic improvement we could make to policy decisions currently is not the 
comparatively minor refinement in the estimated value of life proposed by Frank and Sunstein. 
More valuable would be greater agency care in producing cost benefit studies that adhere to 
currently accepted practices as discussed and described in Gold et al. (1996); and Hahn et al. 
(2000) as well as greater agency adherence to the implications of the estimated benefits and costs 
when setting regulatory policy as discussed and described in Viscusi (1998) and Sunstein (2000). 
The Need for Regulatory Reform 
The policy remedy proposed by Frank and Sunstein involves increasing the value of life 
used by federal agencies in assessing health and safety risk regulations. In our view, the more 
pressing concern is to get agencies to use conventional values of life estimates in their 
calculations of economic benefits of regulations and, more importantly, to select regulations so 
as to achieve a balance between the benefits and costs of regulatory activities.  
 In an effort to overcome the legislative constraints that restrict the ability of agencies to 
base policies on benefit-cost tradeoffs, Congress has considered a variety of proposed forms of 
legislation aimed at regulatory reform. A particularly active year for reform proposals was 1995, 
but none of the proposed bills were ever enacted. 
A key provision in regulatory reform bills is a super-mandate in which the restrictions 
preventing the implementation of benefit-cost test would be overridden by the regulatory reform 
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legislation. In its restrictive form, reform bills could require that no agencies were permitted to 
issue regulations in the absence of demonstrating that the benefits of the regulation exceeded the 
costs. A less stringent possibility (that has not yet been embodied in legislative proposals) would 
be to permit agencies to consider benefits and costs within the process of promulgating 
regulatory policies, which would eliminate the current legislative constraints on regulatory 
agencies and would permit the U.S. Office of Management and Budget to promote the balancing 
of benefits and costs as part of the regulatory oversight process. Although requiring that agencies 
demonstrate that benefits are in excess of the costs of the regulation is more aligned with 
economic efficiency principles, imposing an efficiency test as a legal requirement could 
complicate the process of issuing a new major federal regulation.  
 Some regulatory reform bills have proposed a more elaborate regulatory review process. 
The requirement that the agency demonstrate benefits exceed costs for the regulation could 
potentially generate considerable legal uncertainties for policies in which the benefits are not 
readily quantifiable because they involve goods that are not traded in markets. Many 
environmental amenities have the non-traded property, and economists have been developing 
survey techniques in an effort to attach monetary values to societies’ willingness to pay for 
policy benefits of non-traded goods. One of the more prominent regulatory reform proposals 
included provisions that would provide for peer reviews of regulatory proposals and judicial 
reviews. Additional layers of review potentially could stymie the development of new 
regulations, however.  
A second component of possible regulatory reform is to incorporate risk-risk analysis 
tests, so that on balance, the regulation will have a safety enhancing effect. One form of risk-risk 
tradeoff pertains to substitution risks. Suppose, for example, that the government had chosen to 
ban saccharin as an artificial sweetener. If, instead, people drank products containing sugar, the 
risks of obesity and the attendant hazards posed by obesity would be increased. Thus, to 
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determine the net health benefits banning saccharin, one must take into account how health risks 
will be affected on balance once other changes in behavior are taken into account. Another form 
of risk-risk tradeoff arises because all economic activity poses some form of health and safety 
risk. If, for example, the government were to impose a regulation that entailed the manufacture 
of new forms of pollution control equipment, then it is possible that some workers might be 
injured or killed in the production of the additional pollution control equipment, and the net 
health enhancing effects of the regulation would be, to some extent, diminished.  
The most controversial form of risk-risk analysis, however, pertains to the health 
consequences of excessive regulatory expenditures. Regulatory allocations involve an 
opportunity cost in that they impose real financial costs on consumers and taxpayers because the 
money spent on regulatory costs would otherwise be spent on other bundles of consumer 
commodities. Based on the risk-risk approach, economists have estimated that when government 
agencies propose risk-reducing regulations that impose a cost per life saved at levels of $50 
million or more, then, on balance, the regulation harms individual health. The rationale is that 
consumers could have spent the money on an ordinary bundle of consumer goods and services, 
including health care, the net benefits of which would be health-enhancing (as is reflected in the 
fact that individual longevity increases with income, not only in the United States, but 
throughout the world). Examining the net risk effects of regulation remains important, but the 
role of risk-risk analysis in preventing regulations that are so expensive per life saved that, on 
balance, they harm the individuals’ health should diminish once benefit-cost tests are imposed 
more generally.  
A third major agenda item, with respect to regulatory reform, would be the adoption of 
unbiased risk assessments within the context of regulatory analyses. At present, regulatory 
agencies frequently use various upper-bound values in assessing the risk. Thus, rather than using 
the mean or median risk values, agencies construct risk estimates using parameters that are often 
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upper bounds of the distribution, such as the 95th percentile. By using, for example, the 95th 
percentile for every parameter in a risk analysis, the risk value that is calculated lies well beyond 
the 95th percentile of the distribution of the true risk. In the case of the risks of hazardous waste 
sites, the calculated risk following U.S. EPA assumptions is well beyond the 99th percentile of 
the distribution of the true risk. Regulatory reform bills that provide for unbiased risk assessment 
would force agencies to base regulations on the risks that are likely to occur rather than on worst 
case scenarios. The present policy tilts regulatory agencies away from true risks that actually 
exist and towards dimly understood risks for which the best estimates of the risk are likely to be 
much lower than the figures calculated by the regulatory agency. 
 Other provisions of regulatory reform bills are less essential, but may be worthwhile. 
Some bills have required that agencies engage in additional research and training of regulatory 
officials. Other provisions include requiring that the agency undertake a detailed set of 
comparisons of the risk it is regulating with other risks that it might choose to regulate. 
Indicating the agencies’ priorities among alternative regulations that it might pursue has also 
been suggested as a way of rationalizing polices. Prioritizing comparisons may be less important 
to sound regulatory decisions once OMB has the leeway to impose benefit-cost tests. 
 Our agenda for proposed regulatory reform is in many respects much simpler and 
streamlined than many of the proposed regulatory reform bills. First, in their examinations of 
regulatory programs, agencies should base their assessment of the risks on the mean values of the 
risk using the best available scientific evidence, which will save the greatest expected number of 
lives and should be a paramount social concern. Second, agencies should calculate the cost of 
regulations and assess the value of the benefits using the values of statistical life that have been 
developed in the literature. In our view, there is no reason to adjust their values because of the 
factors pertaining to the positional externalities in the Frank and Sunstein analysis. Third, 
agencies should be permitted to consider fully the benefits and costs of regulations when setting 
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policy. Full consideration of benefits and costs is a provision that should be the minimal 
requirement. There should be either a benefit-cost requirement as part of the regulatory reform 
legislation or a meaningful regulatory oversight effort ensuring that only regulations generating 
more benefits to society than the costs that are incurred will be promulgated. 
Much of what appears in the detailed regulatory reform proposals is not essential and is 
not on our proposed menu of reform. Detailed judicial reviews, lengthy peer review processes, 
retrospective agency assessments of regulations that already exist, and other peripheral proposals 
might be considered in the longer term. However, from the stand-point of the immediate policy 
needs, the major task is to put health and safety risk regulations on sound footing in terms of the 
fundamental character of the regulatory approach. The Frank and Sunstein proposal does not 
contribute to a strengthening of the role for established scientific methods, but indeed further 
undermines the integrity of the use of value of life approaches.  
Conclusion 
The issue of evaluating distributional equity in costs and effects of government 
intervention is like the old saying about the weather, “Everyone complains about it but nobody 
does anything about it.” Just as scientists do not have the technology to change the weather, 
empirical researchers have not generally had the statistical tools to study the average overall 
effect of state intervention in behavior while examining accompanying distributional 
consequences in a transparent and statistically well-justified way. The good news is that things 
are changing, and elegant statistical techniques have started to appear that produce empirically 
robust conclusions about cost and benefit distribution consequences. The bad news is that 
because of their complexity, even the most transparent of the statistical techniques for 
understanding distribution issues are still a long way from being put into widespread use. 
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As alluring as the Frank and Sunstein attempt to introduce simply the distribution of 
outcomes into the typical cost-benefit calculation is, there are good reasons not to do it their way. 
When there is real money on the table, decision makers want evidence based on observed 
behavior in a real-life setting that has been examined with a multivariate statistical model. It is 
not feasible to identify the individual’s reference group uniquely with a statistical model applied 
to observational product and labor market data. Another objection to enlarging the benefits side 
of the typical cost-benefit analysis based on the concerns of Frank and Sunstein is that there may 
be countervailing positional effects stemming from the distribution of the benefit. One’s drive for 
status will include a concern with health and the risk of death or disability, not just income. 
Finally, boosting value of life measures as they recommend will have little consequential effect 
on policy evaluations. 
 Despite the obvious sensitivity of assigning a value to risks to life, the use of value of life 
calculations to value policy benefits has become standard practice throughout the government. 
What accounts for this widespread adoption of the method? In our view, the fact that the 
estimates are based on real market data for life and death choices rather than hypothetical 
thought experiments is a major contributing factor. Moreover, given the sensitivity of the 
concerns, it is noteworthy that implicit value of life estimates are derived from the value workers 
themselves place on risks of death as reflected in their labor market decisions. The Frank and 
Sunstein adjustments are based on hypothetical experiments and happiness surveys in the 
Netherlands and elsewhere for which the link to how people value risks to their life is much less 
transparent. 
Superimposing speculative adjustments to value of life figures through the Frank and 
Sunstien approach is not an innocuous policy exercise. Valuing risks to life remains one of the 
most controversial components of policy evaluation. Given this inherent sensitivity, the ability to 
trace value of life benefit numbers back to the revealed preferences of the citizenry gives them a 
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degree of legitimacy that may be compromised by adjustments based on hypothetical classroom 
experiments and “happiness” surveys of dubious reference. What is at stake is not simply the 
benefit-cost cutoff for policies, which may not be altered greatly. Future proposals for other 
speculative adjustments to benefits values could, of course, have more consequential effort. 
However, the greatest immediate danger is to the underlying integrity of the benefit assessment 
process and the credibility of these estimates. 
 Our advocacy of implicit values of life as typically constructed does not imply that there 
are no remaining issues to be explored. Among the most glaring informational needs are how we 
should value the lives of the elderly, who may have few years of remaining life expectancy, and 
children, who have an entire lifetime ahead. Risks to future generations also are difficult to 
value. Progress along the age and generational lines of program beneficiaries and payers will 
hinge on ascertaining what the accurate risk-money tradeoff is for each group of interest. Frank 
and Sunstein seek to complicate policy evaluation with a concern for how a small decrease in 
one’s income implicit in purchasing a reduction in risk will affect one’s position on the economic 
status treadmill. However, we find no compelling evidence that the quest for economic status 
should lead to any adjustment in the value of life currently used in policy evaluations.
 24
  
 
25
 
 
Endnotes 
∗. The authors can be reached as follows: Professor Thomas J. Kniesner, Center for 
Policy Research, 426 Eggers Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244–
1020. Email: Tkniesne@maxwell.syr.edu; Phone: (315) 443–4589. Professor W. 
Kip Viscusi, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email: 
kip@law.harvard.edu. Phone: (617) 496–0019. Viscusi’s research was supported 
by the Sheldon Seevak Research Fund and the Olin Center for Law, Economics 
and Business. We thank Gregory Besharov, J. Isaac Brannon, Andrzej Grodner, 
Robert Hahn, Jerry Miner, and Cass R. Sunstein for their comments. Martha 
Bonney provided her usual expert bibliographic assistance. 
 
1.  For a brief and readable discussion, see Kniesner (1997). 
 
2.  For a review of the evidence, see Viscusi (1998), especially Table 4.2. 
 
3. See Frank and Sunstein at page 326. 
 
4.  See Frank and Sunstein at page 323. 
 
5.  For additional theoretical discussion of offsetting positional effects, see Besharov 
(2001). 
 
6.  For additional theoretical discussion of multiple reference groups, see Besharov 
(2001). 
 
7.  See, for example, Newhouse and Phelps (1976). 
 
8.  Evidence based on the evidence on page 369 of Viscusi and Evans (1990). 
 
9.  See Viscusi (1979). 
 
10.  See Viscusi (1983). 
 
11.  For more discussion of the size of positional (externality) effects, see Besharov 
(2001). 
 
12.  See page 340 of Frank and Sunstein as they discuss loss aversion with respect to 
how people must pay for regulation. 
 
13.  Among the extensive empirical studies of peer group effects is the important 
recent study by Ginther, Haveman, and Wolfe (2000), who find that any estimated 
effects of neighborhood characteristics on young persons' schooling completion 
and non-marital childbearing disappear when the multivariate model includes 
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extensive information on the individual's and the family's characteristics. For an 
overview of the econometric literature on peer or reference group effects see 
Moffitt (2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2001). Our extensive bibliography of peer 
group effects is on file at and available upon request from the editorial office of 
the Yale Journal on Regulation. 
 
14.  See pages 337–338 of Frank and Sunstein. 
 
15.  These examples are from page 353 of Frank and Sunstein. 
 
16.  See page 46 of the National Safety Council (2000). 
 
17.  Users of statistical results concerning human behavior typically consider not only 
the estimated average outcome but also a range of possible outcomes based on 
theoretical considerations or on the expected precision of the estimated average 
outcome (Krantz 1999). Incorporating the statistical accuracy of an estimate 
means that policy evaluations usually consider a range of outcomes rather than 
just the best single estimate of the outcome. Our own preference is for the use of 
mean values of parameters when undertaking assessments of benefits and costs. 
However, government agencies often rely on worst case assumptions in assessing 
risk, or upper bound values. It is noteworthy that the Frank and Sunstein estimates 
fall within the bounds of error for estimated value of life. Consider the well-
known estimate of the value of a statistical life from Thaler and Rosen (1975). 
Using Thaler and Rosen’s core results, we find a range for workers’ implied 
willingness to pay for workplace safety that is the average minus 80 to 240 
percent and the average plus 80 to 240 percent. Notice that the smallest optimistic 
outcome for willingness to pay that a careful policy analyst would routinely 
consider in our example is the average plus 80 percent. This is a 2.4 times greater 
adjustment than Frank and Sunstein’s (33 percent) back-of-the envelope 
calculation of how current practice supposedly underestimates the value of life by 
ignoring distributional issues. Even if the estimated average value of life is, say, 
five times as large as its standard error, a comprehensive policy evaluation would 
consider the average plus 60 percent, which is almost double the add factor Frank 
and Sunstein offer. 
 
18.  See Breyer (1993), Table 5. 
 $ Millions 
7,509,869.9
121,303.8
113,572.7
25,173.9
5,520.9
860.3
221.6
164.4
145.8
140.8
97.5
93.4
83.7
67.9
59.3
43.3
41.8
36.4
30.3
27.0
17.8
12.1
11.7
10.9
8.0
7.5
4.5
4.5
4.2
3.7
2.9
2.1
2.0
2.0
1.8
1.7
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0
Hazardous w aste listing for w ood-preserving chemicals
Atrazine/alachlor drinking w ater standard
Formaldehyde occupational exposure limit (c)
Municipal solid w aste landfill standards (proposed)
Hazardous w aste land disposal ban (1st 3rd)
1, 2-dichloropropane drinking w ater standard
Benzene NESHAP (revised): w aste operations
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) cattle feed ban
Asbestos ban
Arsenic occupational exposure limit (c)
Asbestos occupational exposure limit (c)
Lockout/tagout (c)
Coke ovens occupational exposure limit (c)
Acrylonitrile occupational exposure limit (c)
Cover/move uranium mill tailings (active sites)
Benzene NESHAP (revised: transfer operations)
Cover/move uranium mill tailings (inactive sites)
Hazardous w aste listing for petroleum refining sludge
Arsenic/copper NESHAP
Ethylene oxide occupational exposure limit (c)
Arsenic emission standards for glass plants
Electrical equipment standards (coal mines) (c)
Benzene occupational exposure limit (c)
Asbestos occupational exposure limit (c)
Benzene NESHAP (revised: coke byproducts) (c)
Ethylene dibromide drinking w ater standard
Standards for radionuclides in uranium mines (c)
Benzene NESHAP (original: fugitive emissions)
Rear lap/shoulder belts for autos
Grain dust explosion prevention standards (c)
Side impact standards for trucks, busses, and MVPs (proposed)
Hazard communication standard (c)
Trenching and excavation standards (c)
Traff ic alert and collision avoidance (TCAS) systems
Electrical equipment standards (metal mines)
Low -altitude w ind shear equipment & training standards
Side impact standards for autos (dynamic)
Children's sleepw ear f lammability ban (d)
Auto side door support standards
Crane suspended personnel platform standard
Passive restraints for trucks & buses (proposed)
Aircraft f loor emergency lighting standard
Concrete & masonry construction standards (c)
Aircraft seat cushion f lammability standard
Alcohol and drug control standards (c)
Auto fuel-system integrity standard
Standards for servicing auto w heel rims (c)
Trihalomethane drinking w ater standards
Unvented space heater ban
Aircraft cabin f ire protection standard
Auto passive restraint/seat belt standards
Steering column protection standard (b)
Underground construction standards (c)
Cost Per Premature Death Averted
($ millions 2000)
(a) 70-year lifetime exposure assumed 
unless otherw ise specif ied
(b) 50-year lifetime exposure
(c) 45-year lifetime exposure
(d) 12-year exposure period Source:  Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effect ive Risk Regulat ion (Harvard 
University Press,  1993), Table 5, p. 24-27.  Breyer's data converted f rom 1990 to 2000 dollars.
Regulation (a)
Table 1: Costs of Selected Regulations
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